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Freedom Thwarted:
Israel's Illegal Attack on the Gaza Flotilla
George Bisharat
Carey James
Rose Mishaan*
INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of May 31, 2010, Israeli paratroopers de-
scended by ropes from hovering helicopters to the deck of the Mavi
Marmara, sailing through the black waves of the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea. The ship was the largest of six comprising the "Gaza Freedom Flo-
tilla" that had departed some days earlier from a rendezvous point near
Turkey for the Gaza Strip. Flotilla organizers hoped their attempt to de-
liver humanitarian goods to Gaza Palestinians would draw publicity to
Israel's siege of the Gaza Strip, and would highlight the claimed inhu-
manity and illegality of that policy. A melee ensued, in which nine civil-
ian ship passengers were killed and numerous others-both ship passen-
gers and Israeli soldiers-were wounded. Controversy immediately
erupted over the propriety and legality of Israel's actions.
Israel steadfastly maintains that the raid on the ship was legitimate.
It further maintains that its soldiers, who allegedly faced provocation by
the Mavi Marmara's passengers,I acted in self-defense and in compli-
. George Bisharat is a Professor at UC Hastings College of the Law, where he teaches
criminal procedure, criminal practice, anthropology of law, and Islamic Law. Carey A.
James is an associate at Aiman-Smith & Marcy. Rose Mishaan is a criminal defense at-
torney based in the San Francisco Bay Area.
1. See, e.g., Seizure of the Gaza Flotilla: Press Conference with Dep FMAyalon,
ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ("MFA") (May 31, 2010), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+1eaders/2010/Gaza-flotill
a Press conference DepFM Ayalon_31-May-2010.htm?DisplayMode-print;
Full Text Statement by Israel's Netanyahu on Flotilla Deaths, REUTERS, May 31, 2010,
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idlNIndia-48947620100531.
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ance with international law.2 We disagree. Our position is that Israel's
use of force was illegal, owing both to the nature of the raid itself and to
the raid's purpose, which was to enforce the ongoing illegal siege of the
Gaza Strip, of which the naval blockade was an integral part. An analysis
of the facts of the raid, the siege, and the relevant international law
demonstrates the illegality of the raid and establishes that Israel's storm-
ing of what was in fact a humanitarian convoy traveling in international
waters cannot be justified as self-defense. This conclusion holds, we be-
lieve, despite the resistance to Israeli forces offered by some of the pas-
sengers of the Mavi Marmara.
Following this introduction, in Part I, we review the facts of the in-
cident, as best they can be reconstructed from press reports, government
investigations, video evidence, and other sources. Part II probes the le-
gality of the raid, considering first Israel's violations under the law of the
sea, then under the law of armed conflict, and lastly the purpose for
which the raid was launched: to enforce an illegal siege that was impos-
ing a terrible human cost on the civilian population of the Gaza Strip. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND: THE EVENTS OF MAY 31, 2010
A. Flotilla's Engagement with Israeli Forces
In late May 2010, a six-ship flotilla bound for the Gaza Strip set sail
from various ports in the Mediterranean Sea, carrying ten thousand tons
of humanitarian aid 3 and hundreds of individuals from several countries,
including human rights activists, members of the European Parliament,
and an Irish Nobel Peace Prize laureate. 4 A number of groups, including
the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish humanitarian organization In-
san Hak ve Hfirriyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi (i.H.H.), organized the flo-
2. See, e.g., Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu: "No Love Boat," ISR. MiFA
(June 2, 2010), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Govemment/
Speeches+by+Israeli+1eaders/20 10/StatementPMNetanyahu 2-Jun-201 0.htm.
3. Avi Issacharoff et al., Freedom Flotilla Sets Sail for Gaza, HA'ARETZ (May 30
2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/freedom-flotilla-sets-sail-for-
gaza-1.293021.
4. James Hider, Deadly Clashes at Sea as Israel Intercepts Gaza-Bound Aid Ships,
TIMES ONLINE (London) (May 31, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/middle east/article7140957.ece.
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tilla to challenge the three-year siege of Gaza5 that Israel imposed after
Hamas gained control of the Strip in June 2007. The challenge was to be
issued through an attempt to deliver humanitarian aid and supplies to the
people of Gaza, in defiance of Israel's claimed authority to enforce the
siege.6 The ships converged at a rendezvous point in international waters
south of Cyprus on Sunday, May 30, 2010.7
On Wednesday, May 26, 2010, several days before the flotilla left
port, Israel's top ministers met to consider Israel's response to the
planned dispatch.8 According to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, all
ministers present at this meeting supported a plan put forward by the
Army's chief of staff to raid and take control of the flotilla vessels. 9 The
ministers, however, did not only discuss the logistics of the raid. The
central focus of the May 26 meeting, according to Prime Minister Ben-
jamin Netanyahu, was the anticipated media and diplomatic backlash of
the planned operation.' 0
An Israeli military convoy left Haifa to intercept the flotilla at ap-
proximately 9 p.m. on May 30.11 Israeli military vessels approached the
flotilla in international waters around 11 p.m. As Israeli forces ap-
proached, the flotilla radioed the Israeli ships with requests not to attack,
5. Isabel Kershner, Israel Intercepts Gaza Flotilla; Violence Reported, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/middleeast/3 1 flotilla.html.
6. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission
To Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law, Resulting From the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying
Humanitarian Assistance, 79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (Sep. 27, 2010) [hereinafter
U.N. Report], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.PDF.
7. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 91.
8. Isabel Kershner, Barak Says 'Friction' Was Expected in Flotilla Raid, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/world/middleeast/
SI flotilla.html.
9. Id.
10. Id. When the raid was executed, Israel took actions to ensure that available in-
formation about the raid was tightly controlled. To this end, Israeli commandos appear to
have made it a high priority to seize cameras and recording equipment from journalists on
the ship, at least two of whom maintain that this was the first action taken by Israeli forc-
es when they boarded their ship. See Amy Goodman, Framing the Narrative: Israeli
Commandos Seize Videotape and Equipment from Journalists After Deadly Raid,
DEMOCRACY Now (June 9, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/6/9/
framingthe narrative israeli commandos seizes.
11. Kershner, supra note 8.
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and traveled deeper into international waters. 12 Shortly after 4 a.m., Is-
raeli commandos initiated a raid on the flotilla's ships. Throughout the
raid, the flotilla remained in international waters, 13 between seventy and
ninety miles off the coast of Israel.14
B. The Mavi Marmara
The raid of the largest of the convoy's ships, the Mavi Marmara, re-
sulted in the deaths of nine of its passengers. The Mavi Marmara had
embarked from Turkey and carried nearly six hundred passengers of
primarily Turkish origin.15 Accounts vary as to exactly how the raid be-
gan. A lieutenant colonel in the Israeli commando unit Flotilla 13 (which
took part in the raid) informed the Jerusalem Post that Israeli forces fired
warning shots and threw several stun grenades before boarding the Mavi
Marmara.16 Israeli commandos also fired a barrage of rubber bullets
from the air. 17 According to Sarah Colborne, a passenger on the Mavi
Marmara, Israeli troops appeared to be firing from a hovering helicop-
ter.18 Ms. Colborne was unable to determine whether or not the shots the
Israelis fired from above consisted of live ammunition.19 According to a
New York Times report published on June 4, "The crack of an Israeli
12. Alexander Christie-Miller & Raf Sanchez, Returned British Activists Describe
Israeli 'Massacre,' TIMES ONLINE (June 3, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/uk/article7143029.ece.
13. Hider, supra note 4; Kershner, supra note 8.
14. LAWYERS FOR PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS (LPHR), THE ATTACK ON THE GAZA
FREEDOM FLOTILLA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), http://www.lphr.org.uk/
FlotillialL QA/LPHR FlotillialLQA.pdf (stating the flotilla was "approximately 90
miles" from the Gaza coast); Glen Kessler, Turkish Foreign Minister: Israeli Raid on
Gaza Aid Flotilla 'Like 9/11' for His Country, WASH. POST (June 1,
2010),http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/
AR2010060101506.html (reporting that the flotilla was seventy-two miles from the
coast).
15. THE PUBLIC COMM'N To EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010
(THE TURKEL COMM'N), REPORT I PART ONE 113 (2011), available at http://www.turkel-
committee.com/files/wordocs/8808report-eng.pdf [hereinafter TURKEL COMM'N REPORT].
16. Yaakov Katz, "We Had No Choice," JERUSALEM POST (June 4, 2010),
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177445.
17. Sabrina Tavernise & Ethan Bronner, Days of Planning Led to Flotilla 's Hour of
Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2010), http://nyti.ms/xs4oa3.
18. Christie-Miller & Sanchez, supra note 12.
19. Id.
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sound grenade and a hail of rubber bullets from above were supposed to
disperse activists, but instead set them in motion." 20 The stun grenade (or
grenades) and the firing of rubber bullets, according to witnesses, caused
several passengers on the Mavi Marmara to believe they were being shot
with live ammunition. 21
An initial attempt to board the ship was unsuccessful, as passengers
hurled items such as plates and chairs at the soldiers. 22 Minutes later, an
Israeli helicopter hovering close above the top deck of the ship shot live
ammunition, and then Israeli soldiers descended onto the deck.23 As the
soldiers descended, the Mavi Marmara passengers attacked them,24 and
the scene quickly descended into chaos. "A man was shot in the head, I
saw him being dragged back from the deck. I saw him being tended to
and then he died," Ms. Colborne told the Times ofLondon, "People were
dying all over the place. It was horrific." 25 Paul McGeough, Chief Corre-
spondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, was a passenger on another ship
in the flotilla and witnessed events as they unfolded. He reported that as
the Israeli commandos attempted to board the Mavi Marmara, the pas-
sengers were "throwing things, rubbish, down on them. They were
throwing bits and pieces of the boat. There was a lot of yelling and
screaming." 26
As part of its investigation, the UN Human Rights Council found
that live ammunition fired from three helicopters and by soldiers who
landed on deck resulted in fatal injuries to four passengers, as well as
many other non-fatal injuries. Evidence also suggests that Israeli soldiers
shot live ammunition at individuals not engaged in the melee and at oth-
ers who were already injured or incapacitated. 27 Four others were killed
when soldiers entered the bridge deck and opened fire.28 In addition,
several injured Israeli soldiers were taken captive by the ships' passen-
gers and given medical attention. The passengers subsequently released
20. Tavernise & Bronner, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 113.
23. Id. 1114.
24. Id.
25. Christie-Miller & Sanchez, supra note 12.
26. Goodman, supra note 10.
27. U.N. Report, supra note 6, % 117-18.
28. Id. 120.
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the soldiers.29 When the smoke cleared, nine flotilla passengers were
dead, and nine Israeli soldiers were injured.30 Following the raid, Israeli
soldiers handcuffed passengers and commandeered the vessels to the Is-
raeli port of Ashdod.31
C. International Reaction
Israel drew widespread international condemnation for the flotilla
raid and the civilian deaths that resulted.32 On Monday, May 31, the UN
Security Council "expressed deep regret at the loss of life and injuries
resulting from the use of force during the Israeli military operation early
on Monday in international waters against the convoy sailing to Gaza,
and condemned those acts which had killed at least ten civilians and
wounded many more." 33 The Council of Europe passed a resolution stat-
ing that:
[The Parliamentary Assembly] considers the Israeli raid, which took
place in international waters, an illegal act constituting a breach of inter-
national law, in particular customary law of the sea and international hu-
man rights and humanitarian law .. . It shares, in this respect, the posi-
tions of condemnation taken by the United Nations, the Quartet, the
European Union and the majority of the international community. 34
Israel has offered a number of explanations for its actions during the
May 31 raid. Speaking shortly after the raid, Israeli Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Danny Ayalon asserted that the organizers of the flotilla are "well-
known" for their ties to Al-Qaeda and that their "intent was violent, their
method was violent, and unfortunately, the results were violent." 35 Mr.
Ayalon also stated that the flotilla's organizers have a "history" of "dead-
29. Id. 125-26.
30. TURKEL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 114.
31. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 133.
32. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1748 (2010):
Flare-up of Tension in the Middle East (June 24, 2010), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link/Documents/AdoptedText/tal0/eRESl748.htm
[hereinafter Resolution 1748]; Ban Ki-moon: 'Shocked by raids,' JERUSALEM PosT (May
31, 2010), http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id= 176966.
33. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in
Civilian Deaths During Israeli Operation Against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls for In-
vestigation, in Presidential Statement, U.N. Press Release SC/9940 (May 31, 2010),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9940.doc.htm.
34. Resolution 1748, supra note 32.
35. Seizure of the Gaza Flotilla, supra note 1.
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ly terror." 36 But these assertions are difficult to reconcile with later
claims that Israeli military officials expected primarily passive resistance
during the raid.37 Mr. Ayalon also stated Israeli forces found weapons
"prepared in advance and used against [Israeli] ... forces" on board the
Mavi Marmara.38 When asked by a reporter if he could provide the press
with "details, even if not in pictures, about the weapons" allegedly dis-
covered on the ship, Mr. Ayalon responded: "the event is still ongoing: it
has not yet ended, and so until it's over-we are currently not at liberty
to provide more details." 39
D. Were the Passengers Armed?
The two sides dispute whether the passengers were armed at the time
of the boarding. Turkish authorities inspected the flotilla's ships for
weapons before the ships set sail. In the aftermath of the raid, Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that the convoy's ships
were "checked in a strict way under the framework of the rules of inter-
national navigation and were only loaded with humanitarian aid."40 Nev-
ertheless, the passengers were not unarmed when they resisted the raid.
The passengers engaged Israeli soldiers with wooden and metal rods, and
stabbed at least one commando. 41 Many of the passengers' weapons ap-
pear to have been parts of the ship that they pried loose.42 Indeed, the
Human Rights Council's report on the flotilla raid stated that "the fact
that some passengers engaged in last minute efforts to fashion rudimen-
tary weapons shortly prior to the interception confirms the findings of the
Mission that no weapons were brought on board the ship." 43
Israel, however, claims that its forces were met with gunfire,44 and
36. Id.
37. Tavernise & Bronner, supra note 17 ("That the military was expecting mainly
passive resistance is being seen in Israel as an intelligence failure. It could be viewed as a
strange assumption given that Israel's defense minister, Ehud Barak, later characterized
the Turkish group as a dangerous Islamic organization with terrorist links-a charge the
organization rejects.").
38. Seizure of the Gaza Flotilla, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Tavemise & Bronner, supra note 17.
42. Id.
43. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 101.
44. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 16.
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at least one Israeli soldier reportedly suffered a gunshot wound.45 But
there is little evidence to suggest that the ships' passengers brought fire-
arms on board with them, or that the passengers ever used any firearms.46
Instead, many reports indicate that early in the raid, passengers seized
several Israeli firearms and threw them overboard to prevent their use by
the commandos. 47 On the other hand, at least one Israeli soldier was
thrown from an upper deck to a lower deck of the ship.48
Israel did ultimately discover knives, clubs, and slingshots on board
the Mavi Marmara, as well as bulletproof vests and gas masks.49 Such
rudimentary weaponry does not seem consistent with a well-coordinated
plan to resist Israeli military might. In any case, we believe that the Mavi
Marmara's crew and passengers had rights of self-defense against Isra-
el's illegal boarding of their vessel, and were entitled to use force propor-
tional to that which they perceived they were facing. Reasonably believ-
ing that they were confronting lethal force from Israeli commandos, the
ship's crew and passengers would have been legally entitled to use fire-
arms to repel the attack, had they been available to them. In fact, they
used less powerful weapons than were legally permissible given the cir-
cumstances they were facing at the time of the attack.
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE MAY 31,2010 RAID
Despite Israel's self-defense claims, the May 31 raid was illegal for
three primary reasons: (1) where the raid occurred-in international wa-
ters and in violation of the law of the sea; (2) how Israeli forces conduct-
ed the raid-in a manner that violated international law governing armed
conflict; and (3) why Israel undertook the raid-to enforce its illegal
blockade of the Gaza Strip.
45. Ari Rabinovitch, Israel Wasn't Ready for Flotilla Resistance-General,
REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE67AINX2010081 1.
46. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 1 116.
47. See, e.g., Reuters, Activists "Threw Israeli Guns into Sea," IRISH TIMES (June 6,
2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/0603/breaking24.html.
48. Ron Ben-Yishai, A Brutal Ambush at Sea, Y NET NEWS (May 31, 2010),
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3896796,00.html.
49. Ron Friedman, Wheelchairs as Well as Weapons Found on Board Aid Ships,
JERUSALEM POST (June 3, 2010), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177342.
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A. Violations of the Law of the Sea
Israel's raid of the Mavi Marmara occurred in international waters50
approximately seventy to ninety miles off the coast of Israel. 51 The U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)-the primary internation-
al treaty delineating the maritime rights and obligations of states-
codifies much of the customary international law regarding the sea.52
One hundred and sixty nations have ratified the UNCLOS. Israel is not a
party to the treaty, but many of its provisions reflect customary interna-
tional law. 53
1. Freedom of the High Seas
UNCLOS defines several major maritime zones in which states ex-
ercise varying degrees of sovereignty. Article 86 of UNCLOS defines the
high seas negatively, or as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
a State . . . ."54 UNCLOS thus designates as the high seas those areas that
do not qualify as one of the other three types of maritime zones specifi-
cally referenced in Article 86. Taken from last to first, the three maritime
zones (which do not constitute the high seas) entail decreasing sovereign-
ty rights for the states to which they belong, with states entitled to exer-
cise complete sovereignty over their internal waters, comparable sover-
eignty over territorial seas, and "extensive rights in relation to natural
resources"55 in their exclusive economic zones. 56
States generally enjoy complete and exclusive sovereignty over their
internal waters,57 and international law provides no right for one state's
50. Security Council Press Release, supra note 33; Resolution 1748, supra note 32.
51. LPHR, supra note 14; Kessler, supra note 14.
52. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 85, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 432, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/v 1833.pdf [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
53. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (2006).
54. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 86.
55. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 348 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 348-49.
57. All waters internal of a state's baseline comprise that state's internal waters. Ar-
ticle 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides: "the normal
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the
coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State."
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vessels to enter another state's internal waters.58 Seaward from the inter-
nal waters, a state's territorial sea lies immediately adjacent to its shore-
line. Article 2(1) provides that the "sovereignty of a coastal State ex-
tends . . . beyond its land territory and internal waters" to the outer edge
of its territorial sea.59 A state's sovereignty over its territorial sea is lim-
ited only by other provisions of the UNCLOS and international law, 60
"such as rules on sovereign and diplomatic immunity." 61
UNCLOS allows states to declare a territorial sea of up to twelve
nautical miles.62 Beyond the territorial sea lies an area a state may de-
clare as an "exclusive economic zone." Within a state's exclusive eco-
nomic zone, that state enjoys
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and explora-
tion of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, cur-
rents and winds.63
Additionally, a state enjoys jurisdiction within its exclusive econom-
ic zone with regard to scientific research; artificial islands, installations,
and structures; and "the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment."64 UNCLOS provides that a state may claim an exclusive eco-
nomic zone of not more than two hundred nautical miles from its coast. 65
Israel claims a territorial sea of twelve nautical miles, the maximum
UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 5; see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 341.
58. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 342-43.
59. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 2(1); see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 344.
60. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 2(3); see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 344.
61. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 344.
62. Article 2(3) of the Convention provides that "[e]very State has the right to estab-
lish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, meas-
ured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." UNCLOS, supra
note 52, art. 2(3). Article 5 provides: "Except where otherwise provided in this Conven-
tion, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water
line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal
State." Id. art. 5; see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 341, 343-44.
63. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 56(l)(a); see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 348.
64. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 56(l)(b); see also MURPHY, supra note 53, at 348.
65. Article 57 provides that "[t]he exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured." UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 57. The Convention gives a definition of base-
line in Article 5. Id. art. 5.
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allowable breadth under UNCLOS, but does not claim an exclusive eco-
nomic zone.66 Thus, according to Article 86, the waters beyond Israel's
territorial sea-that is, beyond twelve nautical miles of Israel's shore-
line-are high seas. 67 The principle that a state's territorial sea may not
extend beyond twelve miles of its coastline is customary international
law. 68 Even if Israel claimed an exclusive economic zone beyond its ter-
ritorial sea, the rights it could exercise in that zone would relate primarily
to natural resources and would not impact the legality of the raid on the
Mavi Marmara.69
Article 87 of UNCLOS guarantees all states "freedom of the high
seas" and provides that this freedom includes the rights of navigation and
overflight.70 "Every state," Article 90 declares, "has the right to sail ships
flying its flag on the high seas."71
66. Field Listing :: Maritime Claims, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
http://1.usa.gov/z7m3Lu (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) [hereinafter CIA, Maritime Claims].
67. Article 33 allows a state to declare a contiguous zone of up to twenty-four miles
beyond its baseline (i.e., twelve miles beyond the maximum declarable breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea). Within this zone, a state may exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses oc-
curring within a state's territory or that state's territorial sea, but not for offenses com-
mitted in the exclusive economic zone or on the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art.
33; see also MURPHY, supra note 35, at 345-46. We do not address the issue of contigu-
ous zones at length because (1) the definition of "high seas" contained in Article 86 of the
UNCLOS contains no reference to contiguous zones; (2) the Mavi Marmara was at no
time present within Israel's internal waters or territorial sea and thus was not subject to
Israel's jurisdiction for activities within those areas; and (3) the raid which is the subject
of this paper occurred well beyond twenty-four miles off the coast of Israel.
68. See, e.g., CIA, Maritime Claims, supra note 66 (documenting the territorial sea
claims of every state on Earth). The vast majority of these extend twelve nautical miles,
and the few that extend some other distance are less than twelve miles, generally three to
four nautical miles. See id.
69. Within a state's exclusive economic zone, "vessels of other states generally en-
joy the same navigational freedoms that they have on the high seas." MURPHY, supra note
53, at 348-49; see also UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 58(1) ("In the exclusive economic
zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions
of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and
of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.").
70. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 87.
71. Id. art. 90.
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2. Exclusive Flag Jurisdiction
Having established that according to UNCLOS Article 86 and cus-
tomary international law, the Mavi Marmara was on the high seas at the
time of the raid, the next question is whether it was nevertheless legal for
Israel to exercise its jurisdiction over the ship in conducting the raid. The
concept of exclusive flag jurisdiction, established in Articles 87 through
90 provides one method of analyzing this question. 72 Article 89 states:
"No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty." In the absence of any state's sovereignty over the high seas
themselves, customary international law provides that vessels upon the
high seas are subject only to the jurisdiction of their flag state. As the
Permanent Court of International Justice observed in 1927, "a ship is
placed in the same position as national territory. . .[W]hat occurs on
board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the
territory of the State whose flag the ship flies." 73 Accordingly,
". . .[V]essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of
the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of
the seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the
high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign
vessels upon them." 74
The principle of exclusive flag jurisdiction is long-established cus-
tomary law.75 Israel's raid of the Mavi Marmara, a vessel flying a Como-
ros Islands flag (although Turkish-owned) in international waters, violat-
ed this law. Though Israel maintains that its raid conformed with
international law, it is well-established that "a ship on the high seas is as-
similated to the territory of the State of the flag of which it flies," and
that "failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, [a state]
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
state." 76
72. Simply stated, this principle means that, "as a general matter, the flag state has
the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas." MURPHY,
supra note 53, at 350.
73. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (quoting the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.)), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 9 (Sept. 7), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/
1927.09.07 lotus.htm).
74. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 64; see also LPHR, supra note 14.
75. LPHR, supra note 14 (citing S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Sept. 7)).
76. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 45; see also LPHR, supra note 14.
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There are two potentially applicable exceptions to the general prin-
ciple of exclusive flag jurisdiction. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas, to which Israel is a party7 7 and which reflects customary
law, 78 provides that a military vessel that encounters a foreign merchant
ship on the high seas "is not justified in boarding her unless there is a
reasonable ground for suspecting" that the foreign vessel is engaged in
piracy, the slave trade, or is "of the same nationality as the warship." 79 A
similar article is found in UNCLOS.80 The Mavi Marmara, however,
was not engaged in any of the activities enumerated in these exceptions,
and Israel had no reasonable ground for suspecting that the Mavi Mar-
mara was so engaged. Moreover, Israel has at no time claimed that it be-
lieved the Mavi Marmara was engaged in such activities or that it was an
Israeli ship. Accordingly, neither the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas nor UNCLOS provide Israel with a justification for its raid. In
the absence of any such justifications, Israel was not entitled to exercise
its power in any form on the Mavi Marmara, which was, as a matter of
international law, the equivalent of Comoran territory.
A second possible exception to the principle of exclusive flag juris-
diction is the enforcement of a blockade, although exactly when and
where this exemption applies is an unresolved issue of international
law81 . Israel claims that its actions on the high seas were justified be-
77. Status of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 29
April 1958, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=JNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=
XXI-1&chapter-21&lang-en#Participants (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (indicating that
Israel signed the Treaty on Apr. 29, 1958 and ratified on Sept. 6, 1961).
78. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 339.
79. Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 22(1), Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20450/v450.pdf; see
also LPHR, supra note 14.
80. Article 110(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that a "warship
which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship .. . is not justified in boarding it unless
there is reasonable ground for suspecting" that the foreign vessel is engaged in piracy, the
slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, is without nationality, or is of the same nationali-
ty as the warship. UNCLOS, supra note 52, art. 110(1). For further discussion, see
MURPHY, supra note 53, at 350; LPHR, supra note 14.
81. Article 1 of the Declaration of London states that "[a] blockade must not extend
beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy." Declaration Con-
cerning the Laws of Naval War art. 1, 208 Consol. T.S. 338 (1909). The Declaration of
London, though "never formally ratified ... came to be accepted as generally expressing,
save for some minor exceptions, the existing international law of blockade." 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed., 2000).
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cause it was enforcing its lawful blockade against the Gaza Strip.82 A
party to an armed conflict who has imposed a lawful blockade may en-
force that blockade on the high seas.83 Therefore, the legality of Israel's
actions rests largely on a determination of whether the blockade itself
was lawful. This issue will be discussed below, in Part II.C.
B. Violations of the Law Governing Armed Conflict
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to consider the legal framework
applicable in this circumstance. The principle of jus in bello84 governs
the conduct of belligerents within an armed conflict, without regard to
the legality of the conflict itself In contrast, the jus ad bellum85 frame-
work governs the legality of initiating an armed conflict, rather than how
the conflict is conducted once begun.
The first framework, jus in bello, is relevant in the present case be-
cause either: (1) Gaza was occupied by Israel, 86 meaning an armed con-
flict already existed,87 or (2) hostilities commenced with either the insti-
82. Roni Sofer, Cabinet: Navy Raid Clear Act of Self-Defense, Y NET NEWS (June 1,
2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3 897631,00.html.
83. U.N. Report, supra note 6, T 51.
84. ICRC: Jus en Bello & Jus Ad Bellum, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-
other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm;
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/v1125.pdf
[hereinafter Protocol I].
85. ICRC: Jus en Bello & Jus Ad Bellum, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-
other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm
86. We believe that the Gaza Strip is still occupied as a matter of international law.
For a detailed analysis of this issue, see infra Section 2; infra note 163; see also Carey
James, Mere Words: The 'Enemy Entity' Designation of the Gaza Strip, 32 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 643 (2009) (discussing Israel's relationship to the Gaza Strip after
the 2005 "disengagement").
87. "There is an inextricable tie between. . . [belligerent].. .occupation and inter-
state war. . .Belligerent occupation may constitute the sole manifestation of a state of war
between State A and State B. Once a territory belonging to State A is coercively seized
by State B, there is automatically a state of war in the material sense between these two
Parties.. .Just as belligerent occupation may be fomented by war, war can be ignited by
belligerent occupation. . . If the occupation of the territory of State A (in whole or in part)
by State B is suffused with coercion, the occupation is belligerent and the relationship
between States A and B shifts from peace to war (even in the absence of hostilities)."
YoRAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 31-35 (2009).
ISRAEL'S ILLEGAL A7TACK ON THE GAZA FLOTILLA
tution of the blockade (an act sufficient to give rise to a state of war)88 or
with the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel.89 Accordingly, for the
purposes of this Section we will first assume the legality of the block-
ade 90 and therefore analyze the raid of the Mavi Marmara under the jus
in bello standard.91 We will now consider the primary way in which we
find that Israel's raid violated it. Specifically, the force used was dispro-
portionate.
1. Disproportionality
The requirement of proportionality is a well-established principle of
customary international humanitarian law.92 It is important to note that
proportionality is not a matter of counting and comparing the number of
casualties or amount of damage on each side. Rather, the basic standard
for proportionality in a jus in bello context appears in Article 51 of the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits in-
discriminate attacks. 93 Indiscriminate attacks are those "which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, dam-
age to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipat-
ed." 94 Therefore, a proportionate attack must not (1) cause excessive
civilian harm (2) in relation to the military advantage sought.
Proportionality is a notoriously difficult principle to apply in prac-
88. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 409.
89. It is arguable that rockets from Gaza constitute an "armed attack" and thus give
rise to a right of self-defense under both customary law and Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter. Note that even if rocket attacks are of the requisite intensity to qualify as an
armed attack, they may not give rise to an Israeli right of self-defense, owing to the pos-
sible ongoing occupation of Gaza by Israel. See Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, $ 139 (July 9). Howev-
er, regardless of this question, we believe it is established that Israel was already engaged
in an armed conflict at the time the May 31 raid on the flotilla occurred.
90. We consider the legality of the blockade itself, a jus ad bellum consideration,
infra Section C.
91. We believe the jus ad bellum standard could also be relevant in considering the
unlikely scenario that the raid of the Mavi Marmara was an act of self-defense against
Turkey, with which Israel is not engaged in an ongoing conflict.
92. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46-50 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts et al. eds., 2005).
93. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 51(4).
94. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
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tice.95 There is no concrete standard for what constitutes excessive harm
to civilians or civilian objects, and the permissible level of "incidental"
civilian harm increases with the degree of the military advantage antici-
pated in a particular attack. There is a significant amount of latitude in
interpreting the proportionality rule, and is often applied in favor of the
military.96 However, this latitude has its limits. In deciding on a military
action, combatants must analyze proportionality on several levels: first in
determining the target itself, then the method of attack, and finally, how
the attack is to be carried out. 97 Despite the inherent ambiguity in the
proportionality principle, Israel's raid of the Mavi Marmara appears to
have been categorically disproportionate.
Regarding the first proportionality calculus in determining the target,
Article 51 of Protocol I requires that the anticipated military advantage
of an attack be "concrete and direct." 98 One scholar argues that the lan-
guage "concrete and direct" in Additional Protocol I implies that the ad-
vantage must be analyzed for each instance of military action, rather than
assessed cumulatively. 99 Supporting this view are the travaux prepar-
atoires of Additional Protocol I, which interprets the "direct and con-
crete" language in the text to mean "substantial and relatively close" and
directing that "hardly perceptible" and "long-term" advantages be disre-
garded. 00 Israel conducted the May 31 raid to enforce its blockade of the
Gaza Strip, which Israel instituted, inter alia, to reduce rocket fire ema-
nating from Gaza. 01 However, there is very little conceivable connection
between depriving Gaza's population of basic necessities and combating
rocket fire. Potential or indeterminate military advantages are insufficient
to satisfy the proportionality standard.102 Therefore, given the tenuous
95. See Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 406, 407 (1993); see also William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy as a Pun-
ishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539, 545-46 (1997).
96. Gardam, supra note 95, at 407.
97. Id.
98. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 51(5)(b).
99. Gardam, supra note 95, at 407.
100. William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting To Develop Usable Legal
Standards for Combat Activities, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 111, 124 (2007).
101. This has been the only justification for the blockade put forward by Israel which
is even arguably legal. The reasoning set out in this Section thus assumes the scenario
most favorable to Israel. For an analysis of the legal status of the blockade, see infra Sec-
tion C.
102. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the First Additional
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connection between raiding the Mavi Marmara and stopping rocket fire
from Gaza, even slight risk to civilians or civilian infrastructure would
make the raid disproportionate.
The second calculus requires an analysis of the method used to at-
tack the target. In the case of Israel's neutralization of the Mavi Marma-
ra, the analysis also supports the conclusion that its May 31 raid was dis-
proportionate. As noted, even if one assumes that the military advantage
gained by diverting the Mavi Marmara was nominal, that operation
could still be considered proportionate if it had resulted in a very low
level of civilian harm. In the days leading up to the raid, Israel consid-
ered at least two other options to prevent the Mavi Marmara from reach-
ing Gaza. 103 To Israel's credit, it reportedly abandoned one of these op-
tions-disabling the ships by sabotaging their engines or propellers-
because it believed this plan could result in the sinking of a large vessel
like the Mavi Marmara.104 Israel appears to have abandoned the other
option, however-that of diverting the ships by attaching ropes or chains
and towing them to shore-because it believed the operation was "im-
practical". 105 Israel instead stormed the flotilla's vessels, fired rubber and
live ammunition, and threw stun grenades as Israeli commandos de-
scended onto ships crowded with confused, frightened and hostile civil-
ians. The civilian harm likely to follow from such an operation should
have been obvious to Israel's military leaders. The fact that this method
of attack resulted in the deaths of nine civilians was entirely foreseeable,
and an unacceptable level of harm in relation to the military objective
achieved.
Finally, even assuming Israel's targeting of the flotilla was an ap-
propriate military objective, and further assuming its plan of using armed
commandos to storm the ships was also appropriate, we must still ana-
lyze the way the attack was carried out to complete the proportionality
analysis. As Gardam notes, "even if these requirements [of target and
method] are met, the conduct of the attack itself must not be negligent
Protocol of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 636, 1 2024,
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987): "Finally, de-
struction, capture or neutralization must offer a definite military advantage in the circum-
stances ruling at the time. In other words, it is not legitimate to launch an attack which
only offers potential or indeterminate advantages."
103. Tavernise & Bronner, supra note 17.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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and involve unnecessary civilian casualties." 106 We can even assume, for
the sake of argument, that Israel intended its commandos to conduct the
raid without using deadly force, perhaps indicated by the claim that the
commandos were provided with paint-ball guns and were instructed to
only use their pistols as a "last resort." 0 7 However, according to wit-
nesses, the soldiers themselves appeared frightened and disoriented when
they boarded the ships. 08 The initial attempts to board were thwarted by
passengers and were unsuccessful.109 Soldiers then used plastic bullets
and sound bombs, terrifying and confusing passengers, who believed
they were being shot at with live ammunition.110 The helicopter above
the ship used live ammunition to clear an area on the ship for the sol-
diers.111 It was in the midst of this chaotic and frantic scene that passen-
gers began arming themselves with whatever they could find and resist-
ing the soldiers. While it may be that the soldiers themselves had no
intention of harming any of the passengers, the trapped passengers had
no way of knowing that. From their perspective, armed commandos
boarded their ship and began firing on them. It should have been obvious
to anyone planning this operation that the soldiers' actions would likely
frighten passengers and quickly create a chaotic and unmanageable situa-
tion. As the U.N. Human Rights Council stated plainly
The conduct of the Israeli military and other personnel towards the flotil-
la passengers was not only disproportionate to the occasion but demon-
strated levels of totally unnecessary and incredible violence. It betrayed
an unacceptable level of brutality. Such conduct cannot be justified or
condoned on security or any other grounds. It constituted a ave viola-
tion of human rights law and international humanitarian law.1 2
C. Illegality of the Raid Owing to Its Goal of
Furthering an Illegal Purpose-The Blockade of Gaza
The raid on the Gaza-bound flotilla was executed in order to enforce
Israel's ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip and must be considered with-
in this context. Proving the illegality of the blockade is critical in reject-
106. Gardam, supra note 95, at 407.
107. Tavemise & Bronner, supra note 17.
108. Id.
109. Id.; U.N. Report, supra note 6, 1 113.
110. Tavemise & Bronner, supra note 17.
111. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 114.
112. U.N. Report, supra note 6, T 264.
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ing the argument that the fact of the blockade constituted an exception to
the customary international law rules against violation of exclusive flag
jurisdiction (see Section II.A.2.). Moreover, the blockade itself violates
several provisions of international law, including those governing Israel
as an occupying power in the Gaza Strip. As such, the raid was illegal
not only because the blockade did not constitute a valid exception to ex-
clusive flag jurisdiction, and thus render illegal Israel's attack on a ship
flying a Turkish flag on the high seas, but also because Israel conducted
it to further an illegal purpose. When a blockade is conducted to further
an illegal purpose, then any actions taken to enforce that blockade are
themselves illegal. If the blockade itself is illegal, as we demonstrate, in-
fra, then any raid of a ship on the high seas is inherently illegal, regard-
less of proffered justification.
1. The Blockade As Intrinsically Illegal
If undertaken outside a context of an ongoing armed conflict, a
blockade is an act of warl1 3 and thus a violation of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter if instituted (1) against a non-belligerent and (2)
not in self-defense or with the Security Council's authorization. In such a
circumstance, the blockade must be analyzed under the jus ad bellum
framework to determine whether the resort to military action was justi-
fied. Israel claims it imposed the blockade in self-defense in response to
rocket fire from Gaza into Israel in 2007.114 Likewise, a blockade im-
posed within the context of an ongoing armed conflict is not inherently
illegal.11 5 Under current international law, a blockade is a legitimate
method of warfare if undertaken in compliance with certain rules. 116
113. "If war has not previously been declared or commenced, the imposition of a
blockade would seem to constitute in itself an act of war and would thus give rise to a
state of war if it is applied and enforced against all vessels, and not merely against those
of the blockaded state." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81,
at 409.
114. TURKEL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 30.
115. An in-depth analysis of the legal status of Israel's blockade of Gaza is presented
infra Section C.
116. In addition to the principles discussed below, the "essential requirements for a
legally binding blockade are threefold: (1) a state of war must exists between the block-
ading and the blockaded States; (2) the blockade must have been duly declared and noti-
fied; and (3) the blockade must be effective." I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81, at 408. In regard to the first requirement, as already
indicated,
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i. Illegal Purpose
A blockade may not prohibit the free passage of relief consign-
ments,117 and blockades intended to starve civilian populations are un-
lawful. 118 Blockades intended to "weaken" populations are also prohibit-
ed.1 19 However, as the ICRC has observed, "the prohibition of starvation
as a method of warfare does not prohibit the imposition of a naval block-
ade as long as the purpose is to achieve a military objective and not to
starve the civilian population."1 20
The requirement that states impose blockades only to meet military
objectives establishes Israel's blockade as intrinsically illegal. Israel in-
stituted its closure of the Gaza Strip in response to a political event-i.e.,
Hamas' seizure of power in 2007.121 Despite statements asserting that the
blockade is in place to combat rocket fire, there is little demonstrable
[i]f war has not previously been declared or commenced, the imposition of a
blockade would seem to constitute in itself an act of war and would thus give
rise to a state of war if it is applied and enforced against all vessels, and not
merely against those of the blockaded state.
Id. at 409.
117. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary to Article 59 of Convention
(IV) (1949)-Relief Collective Relief (1), para. 3, in ICRC, 1949 Conventions & Addi-
tional Protocols & Their Commentaries, ICRC, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600066?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter Red Cross Commentaries] ("[R]elief consignments for the population of an
occupied territory must be allowed to pass through the blockade; they cannot under any
circumstances be declared war contraband or be seized as such by those enforcing the
blockade. The obligation to authorize the free passage of relief consignments is accom-
panied by the obligation to guarantee their protection. It will not be enough merely to lift
the blockade and refrain from attacking or confiscating the goods. More than that will be
required: all the States concerned must respect the consignments and protect them when
they are exposed to danger through military operations.").
118. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 54(1); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 92, at 188.
119. ICRC, Commentary to Article 54 of Protocol I (1977): Protection of Objects
Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population, in Red Cross Commentaries,
supra note 117, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750069?OpenDocument.
120. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 92, at 189 (em-
phasis added).
121. See, e.g., Behind the Headlines: Israel Designates Gaza a "Hostile Territory,"
ISR. MFA (Sept. 24, 2007),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Gaza+designat
ed+a+%E2%80%9CHostile+Territory/oE2%80%9D+24-Sep-2007.htm.
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nexus between denying basic goods to Gaza's population and reducing
rocket attacks. Israel has argued that the nexus lies in the possibility of
goods that can be used to make weapons being smuggled into Gaza
through aid and other shipments. 122 However, statements by Israel have
belied this proffered justification and have implied or explicitly con-
firmed that the blockade's purpose is to pressure Hamas by limiting its
ability to provide services to the population of Gazal 23 or to deprive the
population itself.124 We believe that the continued imposition of the
blockade, even when rocket fire has eased or ceased entirely, demon-
strates the primacy of the blockade's illegal purposes.' 25
122. See Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu, supra note 2. Prime Minister Net-
anyahu stated that there are boats trying to smuggle weapons and "war material" into Ga-
za from Iran and other places. Id; see also TURKEL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at
53-54.
123. See Mazal Mualem, Ministers Slam AG for Prohibiting Punitive Power Cuts to
Gaza, HA'ARETZ (Nov. 11, 2007), http://www.haaretz.com/news/ministers-slam-ag-for-
prohibiting-punitive-power-cuts-to-gaza-1.232997.
124. See, e.g., Behind the Headlines, supra note 121 ("When has a state under con-
stant attack, supplied a hostile population with the provisions necessary to carry out these
attacks.") (emphasis added). Beyond this statement's implication that Israel is targeting
Gaza's population, Israel has failed demonstrate how, e.g., seeds, nuts, biscuits, sweets,
potato chips, dried fruit, canned fruit, fruit preserves, fruit juice, plaster, fishing rods,
fresh meat, and chocolate constitute "provisions necessary to carry out .. . attacks." See
also U.N. Report, supra note 6, 30 (mentioning Israel's rationale for restricting move-
ment of goods into and out of Gaza as intended to apply pressure on the Hamas govern-
ment). It is important to note here that the Palmer Report, commissioned by the U.N. Sec-
retary-General's Panel of Inquiry, found Israel to have no illegal purpose in implemented
the official blockade in 2009. SIR GEOFFREY PALMER ET AL., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL'S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON THE 31 MAY 2010 FLOTILLA INCIDENT 1 77 (2011),
available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle east/Gaza FlotillaPanel Report.pdf) [here-
inafter PALMER REPORT]. However, the Report defined the blockade in the narrowest
terms possible: Israel's formal declaration of the blockade in January of 2009. We, in
contrast, consider the blockade to be the entire policy of closure that Israel has imposed
on Gaza with incremental increases in severity, since Hamas gained control of the Gaza
Strip in 2007, as will be discussed infra Section C.
125. Nancy Kanwisher et al., Reigniting Violence: How Do Ceasefires End?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-
kanwisher/reigniting-violence-how-d b 15561 1.html; Uneasy Gaza Truce Comes into
Effect, AL JAZEERA (June 19, 2008),
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/06/2008619122925385372.html.
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ii. Disproportionality
Even if the blockade was instituted for a legitimate purpose, this in
itself does not make it legal. Any action taken in the context of an armed
conflict must follow the rule of proportionality. Recalling our discussion
of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, the applicable standard depends on
whether Israel instituted the blockade as part of an ongoing armed con-
flict (as would be the case if Israel remains an occupying power in Gaza)
or in response to an initial armed attack (as would be the case if rocket
fire from Hamas initiated aggression in the absence of an ongoing armed
conflict).
According to Israel, it instituted the blockade in response to rocket
attacks launched from Gaza.126 If we accept this claim and assume, for a
moment, that Israel no longer occupied Gaza and that such rocket attacks
constituted an "armed attack"127 giving rise to a right of self-defense, a
blockade may be a legitimate exercise of that right. 128 However, the in-
quiry does not end there. The applicable standard of proportionality, jus
ad bellum, requires that any use of force by Israel be proportionate to the
armed attack which provoked it. 129 Tied into the evaluation of propor-
tionality regarding the use of force in a purported act of self-defense (as
Israel has asserted here), the response must also be necessary. Thus, as
the ICJ observed in its 2003 Oil Platforms case, the "criteria of necessity
and proportionality must be observed if a measure is to be qualified as
self-defence."1 30
The criteria of necessity and proportionality reflect customary inter-
national law,131 and it is extremely doubtful that Israel's blockade satis-
fies them. In examining the necessity of a particular military action, the
126. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger & Helene Cooper, As Rice Arrives, Israel Calls Gaza
'Hostile Territory,' N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/world/africa/19iht-mideast.5.7572524.html; Avi
Issacharoff et al., Cabinet Declares Gaza 'Hostile Territory,' HA'ARETZ (Sept. 2, 2007),
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/cabinet-declares-gaza-hostile-territory-
1.229665.
127. As indicated above, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provided that states
are entitled to act in self-defense upon being the subject of an "armed attack." U.N. Char-
ter art. 51.
128. PALMER REPORT, supra note 124, 72.
129. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 446.
130. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 9 (Nov. 6).
131. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 11, 176 (June 27) (emphasis added].
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possibility of peaceful alternatives is a relevant consideration. 13 2 As not-
ed above, Israel was able to bring rocket fire from Gaza to a near-total
halt by concluding a ceasefire with Hamas in June of 2008.133 Israel kept
its blockade intact even during the period of relative calm resulting from
this truce.
Even if one assumes necessity for the sake of discussion, Israel's
blockade of Gaza cannot qualify as proportionate. As of May 2009,
rockets launched from the Gaza Strip had killed fifteen Israeli civil-
ians. 134 Despite this death toll, which undoubtedly reflects a high number
of civilian causalities under any objective standard, Israel's institution of
its blockade-which has deprived Gaza's 1.5 million inhabitants of basic
goods and had devastating effects on nearly every facet of life in the
Strip 35-appears a manifestly disproportionate response to rocket at-
tacks emanating from Gaza. The blockade, making no distinction be-
tween militants and civilians, is a measure that has affected the entire
population of the Strip, resulting in "mass unemployment, extreme pov-
erty and food price rises caused by shortages,"l 36 and leaving "four in
five Gazans dependent on humanitarian aid."' 37 This damage greatly ex-
ceeds the benefit of the stated aim of combating rocket attacks which kill
an average of two Israeli civilians a year.
The Palmer Report, commissioned by the U.N. Secretary-General's
Panel of Inquiry, reached the opposite conclusion. 138 This was in large
part, however, because the Report applied a strict differentiation between
the formal blockade imposed by Israel in January of 2009, and the siege
132. MURPHY, supra note 53, at 446-47.
133. Kanwisher et al., supra note 125.
134. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA: HARM TO CIVILIANS FROM
PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS' ROCKET ATTACKS (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/06/rockets-gaza-0. It should be noted that this
figure includes deaths from rocket attacks occurring between 2001 and August 2005,
when Israel was indisputably occupying the Gaza Strip. Rocket attacks taking place dur-
ing this period could not legitimately be used to support a claim of jus ad bellum self-
defense. Even with the inclusion of these attacks, however, we believe that Israel's
blockade of the Strip fails to satisfyjus ad bellum proportionality.
135. For an in-depth illustration of the harm caused by Israel's closure policy, see
U.N. Report, supra note 6, 37-43.
136. Suffocating Gaza, AMNESTY INT'L (June 1, 2010),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/suffocating-gaza-israeli-blockades-effects-
palestinians-2010-06-01.
137. Id.
138. PALMER REPORT, supra note 124, T 72.
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of Gaza, defined by a general and extended policy of closure on the
Strip. This closure began when Hamas gained control in Gaza in June of
2007.139 At that time, Israel declared the Gaza Strip "hostile territory"' 40
and announced its intention to restrict movement of goods into and out of
Gaza.141 Shortly afterward, restrictions on fuel and electricity entering
the Strip were imposed.142 Israel closed or severely restricted travel of
people and goods through the only three land access points into and out
of Gaza: the Rafah, Erez and Kami crossings.143 Restrictions on sea ac-
cess increased in 2008.144 Gaza's only airport was first closed, then
bombed by Israel in 2001, and remains inoperable.145 A full naval block-
ade was only imposed on January 3. 2009.146
Despite these facts, the Palmer Report states that "it is wrong to im-
pugn the blockade's legality based on another, separate policy [of land
closure]."1 47 We disagree. In assessing proportionality, even the Report
acknowledges that "the specific impact of the naval blockade on the ci-
vilian population in Gaza is difficult to gauge because it is the land cross-
ings policy that primarily determines the amount of goods permitted to
reach Gaza." 48 Analyzing the incidental civilian harm must be consid-
ered in this context. The 2009 blockade cannot be considered entirely
separate from Israel's closure policy.149 Indeed, when Israel imposed its
full blockade in 2009, the sea was the last available access point for
Gazans to receive necessary goods in sufficient quantities. Therefore, the
139. Conol Urquart, Hamas Takes Control of Gaza, GUARDIAN (London) (June 15,
2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/15/israel4.
140. Behind the Headlines, supra note 121.
141. U.N. Report, supra, note 6, 1 30.
142. Id.130-31.
143. See Gaza Closure Defined: Collective Punishment, GISHA: LEGAL CTR. FOR
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, 2 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/GazaClosureDefinedEng.pdf; see also
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
Gaza Closure: Situation Report (Jan. 29, 2008),
http://unispal.un.org/JNISPAL.NSF/0/72472C5E4B6F9703852573E20050B9CB.
144. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 32.
145. Scavengers Collect Rubble of Gaza's Bombed Airport, Y NET NEWS (Aug. 30,
2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3939241,00.html.
146. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 34.
147. PALMER REPORT, supra, note 124,178.
148. Id.
149. See U.N. Report, supra, note 6,$ 28-38.
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blockade did not merely deny ships the option of delivering humanitarian
aid and other supplies by sea, but rather, it effectively served as the final
act that sealed Gazans into a territory with no way out and no means of
importing necessary goods. While preventing weapons from being
smuggled into enemy-controlled territory is certainly a valid military ob-
jective, a method denying substantial quantities of necessary supplies and
humanitarian to a captive, poverty-stricken population of 1.5 million
people through a general closure policy creates an undue amount of "in-
cidental" civilian harm and cannot be considered proportionate.
This conclusion remains unchanged under the jus in bello standard
of proportionality. As discussed above, this standard prohibits the use of
force which may be "expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, in-
jury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."15 0 This standard would apply if we assume Gaza
has remained occupied by Israel even after the 2005 disengagement, and
therefore an on-going armed conflict can be said to exist. First, it is un-
certain that any "concrete and direct" military advantage can be obtained
from denying the population of Gaza food, medical supplies, and other
basic necessities; prohibiting exports; or preventing Gaza's inhabitants
from leaving the Strip. Second, even if one assumes that these activities
are reasonably related to stopping rocket fire, it seems clear that Israel's
siege of a territory inhabited by 1.5 million people has caused injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects which greatly exceeds any mili-
tary advantage achieved. Indeed, as the Human Rights Council conclud-
ed in its 66-page report to the U.N. General Assembly:
a humanitarian crisis existed on the 31 May 2010 in Gaza.. . Any denial
of this cannot be supported on any rational grounds. One of the conse-
quences flowing from this is that for this reason alone the blockade is un-
lawful and cannot be sustained in law. This is so regardless of the
grounds on which one seeks to justify the legality of the blockade. 151
iii. Collective Punishment
Finally, the blockade violates several other provisions of interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law, including those prohibiting
the use of collective punishment. The prohibition of collective punish-
ment contained in Article 33, according to the official ICRC commen-
150. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 51(5)(b).
151. U.N. Report, supra note 6, 261.
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tary, prohibits "penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups
of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity,
for acts that these persons have not committed."l 52 A number of interna-
tional organizations and institutions, including, among many others, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, 153 Oxfam International,154
Human Rights Watch,' 5 Amnesty International,156 B'Tselem,157 and the
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 158 have recognized Isra-
el's blockade of the Gaza Strip as collective punishment. This reflects the
fact that none of the justifications Israel has offered in support of its
blockade-whether to combat rocket attacks, pressure Hamas, or secure
the release of Israeli soldier Galid Shalit-arise from actions that can be
attributed to the civilian population of Gaza, which, by definition, cannot
be the target of military actions. 159 As Amnesty International has ob-
served: "Whatever its stated justification, the blockade is collectively
punishing the entire population of Gaza, the majority of whom are chil-
dren, rather than targeting the Hamas administration or armed
152. ICRC, Commentary to Article 33-Individual Responsibility of Convention (IV)
(1949), in Red Cross Commentaries, supra note 117, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/com/380-600038?opendocument.
153. News Release, ICRC, Gaza Closure: Not Another Year! (June 14, 2010),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/palestine-update-140610.htm.
154. Gaza: "Frontline of Collective Punishment," OXFAM (July 2, 2009),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applications/blogs/pressoffice/2009/07/02/gaza-frontline-of-
collective-punishment/.
155. Israel/Gaza: Weak Mandate Undermines Flotilla Inquiry, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 16, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/16/israelgaza-weak-
mandate-undermines-flotilla-inquiry.
156. Israel Gaza Blockade Must Be Completely Lifted, AMNESTY INT'L (June 17,
2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/israel-gaza-blockade-must-be-
completely-lifted-2010-06-17.
157. The Siege on the Gaza Strip: 1.5 Million People Imprisoned, B'TSELEM,
http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza Strip/20100531 TheSiege onGaza.asp (last
visited Jan. 22, 2012).
158. Esra Bulut & Carolin Goerzig, The EU and the Gaza Blockade: Dismantling
Collective Punishment; Reviving Representative Peacemaking, EUROPEAN INST. FOR SEC.
STUDIES (EUISS) (2010),
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EU and the Gaza blockade.pdf.
159. Protocol I, supra note 84, art. 48 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives."). Article 48 reflects a well-established principle of customary international
law.
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groups." 160
2. The Blockade Violates Israel's Duty as an Occupier
Beyond the foundational illegality established by the blockade's il-
legal purpose and disproportionality, the blockade also contravenes a
number of other important principles of international law stemming from
Israel's role as an occupying power in the Gaza Strip. The primary sig-
nificance of establishing a state of occupation is that international law
imposes legal obligations on an occupying power vis-A-vis the popula-
tion of the occupied territory. Currently, Israel maintains that its 2005
"withdrawal" from Gaza was sufficient to end its occupation of that terri-
tory,161 and that, accordingly, it owes no responsibilities to the popula-
tion of the Strip.162 This position has not been widely accepted, and the
prevailing consensus is that Gaza remains occupied as a matter of inter-
national law.163 The test for determining the existence of an occupation
is that of "effective control."1 64 Israel's continuing occupation of Gaza is
160. Israel Gaza Blockade Must Be Completely Lifted, supra note 136.
161. The Disengagement Plan-General Outline, ISR. MFA (Apr. 18, 2004),
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Disengagement+Plan
+-+General+Outline.htm.
162. The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, ISR. MFA (June 6,
2004), available at
http://www.strategicassessments.org/library/Disengagement/RevisedDisengagement PI
an - CabinetApprovalJune_2004.pdf [hereinafter Revised Disengagement Plan].
163. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 279 ("The proposition that the Israeli occu-
pation in the Gaza Strip is over has gained some support by commentators. Yet that is not
the prevalent opinion, and the present writer cannot possibly accept it.") (references omit-
ted); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, 6, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46le52bl2.html ("In August 2005, Israel withdrew
its settlers and armed forces from Gaza. Statements by the Government of Israel that the
withdrawal ended the occupation of Gaza are grossly inaccurate."); Human Rights
Watch, Israel: Threatened Sanctions on Gaza Violate Laws of War (Sept. 20, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/09/19/israel-threatened-sanctions-gaza-violate-laws-war
("Israel remains an occupying power in the Gaza Strip even though it withdrew its mili-
tary forces and illegal civilian settlers in August and September 2005. . .").
164. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex art. 42,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/hague04.asp [hereinafter Hague IV] ("Territory
is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile ar-
my.").
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established by its ongoing effective control of that territory. This effec-
tive control arises from, inter alia, Israel's reservation1 65 and exercise of
the "right" to conduct military operations in the Strip;166 exclusive con-
trol of Gaza's airspace and territorial waters; 167 control over all but one
crossing into Gaza;168 control of Gaza's electricity system, telecommuni-
cations network and sewage system; and control over Gaza's population
registry, 169 giving it the authority to determine legal residency in Gaza,
and prevent the entrance into Gaza of individuals it chooses not to regis-
ter.170
The duties of an occupier arise because the occupying force has pre-
vented the functioning of the indigenous government, and therefore it
must assume some degree of responsibility for the population of that ter-
ritory. Because Israel has retained much of the authority that would ordi-
narily reside with any indigenous government of Gaza, Israel must "pro-
vide or at least allow for provision of the kinds of services ordinarily to
be expected from a government."'71 It is from this duty that many facets
165. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 162.
166. DINSTEIN, supra note 87, at 279 (stating that continuing military operations in
the Strip are, "perhaps, the crux of the matter. Despite the unilateral withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip, Israel still believes that it is free (on an equally unilateral basis) to send back
its armed forces into the area whenever such a move is deemed vital to its security. In
point of fact, Israeli military incursions into various parts of the Gaza Strip (as well as air
and naval strikes) have occurred relentlessly subsequent to the unilateral withdrawal, in
response to intermittent missile fire and occasional other attacks originating from within
the Strip. . . . The insistence by Israel on its liberty to retake militarily (at its discretion)
any section of the Gaza Strip-and even to bring to Israel for detention or prosecution
suspected saboteurs-is the most telling aspect of the non-termination of the occupa-
tion . . .. After all, as noted... , belligerent occupation is not contingent on maintaining
a fixed garrison and it is enough for the Occupying Power to have the capacity to send
detachments of troops, as and where required, 'to make its authority felt.'
167. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 162.
168. The Scope of Israeli Control in the Gaza Strip, B'TSELEM, available at
http://www.btselem.org/english/GazaStrip/Gaza Status.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
Additionally, despite Egypt's technical control over the Rafah crossing, that crossing has
largely remained closed since 2007. Gaza Strip: Rafah Crossing, B'TSELEM,
http://www.btselem.org/gaza strip/rafah crossing (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
169. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Gaza: Israel's Fuel and Power Cuts Vio-
late Laws of War (Oct. 29, 2007),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/29/isrlpal 7198txt.htm.
170. Human Rights Watch, "Forget About Him, He's Not Here": Israel's Control of
Palestinian Residency in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 8,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/02/05/forget-about-him-he-s-not-here.
171. Dunoffsupra note 73. at 590; see also Israel Gaza Blockade Must Be Complete-
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of the illegality of Israel's blockade arise.
As the de facto power in Gaza, Israel has an affirmative duty to en-
sure that the basic needs of Gazans are met, 172 that health care infrastruc-
ture remains in place, 173 and, if there is an inadequate provision of basic
needs or health care infrastructure, to allow relief into the territory. 174
Additionally, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague regulations requires that an
occupying power "take all the measures in his power to restore, and en-
sure, as far as possible, public order and safety" in the occupied territo-
ry.175 With its blockade, Israel has not only failed to ensure these things,
ly Lifted, supra note 156 ("As the occupying power, Israel bears the foremost responsibil-
ity for ensuring the welfare of the inhabitants of Gaza.").
172. The International Committee of the Red Cross observed in June 2011 that
"[u]nder international humanitarian law, Israel must ensure that the basic needs of
Gazans, including adequate health care, are met." ICRC News Release, supra note 153.
Furthermore, Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides: "To the fullest extent
of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and
medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary food-
stuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inad-
equate." Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 55, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 322, available at http://
http://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280158bla [hereinafter Ge-
neva IV]. The official ICRC Commentary to Article 55 states: "The rule that the Occupy-
ing Power is responsible for the provision of supplies for the population places that Pow-
er under a definite obligation to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions
under which the population of the occupied territory lives" and that "the duty of ensuring
supplies is reinforced by an obligation to bring in the necessary articles when the re-
sources of the occupied territory are inadequate." ICRC, Commentary to Article 55 of
Convention (IV) (1949)-Food and Medical Supplies for the Population (1), in Red Cross
Commentaries, supra note 117, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM380-
600062?OpenDocument.
173. Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: "To the fullest extent of the
means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining,
with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establish-
ments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory . . . ." Geneva IV,
supra note 172, art. 56.
174. As the occupying power in Gaza, Israel is bound by Article 59 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention, which provides that if "the population of an occupied territory is inade-
quately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal." See id. art. 59. Arti-
cle 59 also requires that Israel permit the free passage of aid and guarantee its protection.
See id. Furthermore, the ICRC Commentary on this Article states: "The obligation on the
Occupying Power to accept such relief is unconditional. In all cases where occupied terri-
tory is inadequately supplied the Occupying Power is bound to accept relief supplies des-
tined for the population." ICRC, Commentary to Article 59, supra note 117, para. 1.
175. Hague IV, supra note 164, annex art. 43.
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but has taken positive steps which ensure that the population of Gaza is
not provided with basic needs or adequate medical care. 176 Rather than
permitting and facilitating the free passage of aid, Israel has, with its
blockade, placed severe restrictions on the entry of aid into the Strip and
prevented entrance of many products entirely.' 7 7 The blockade has not
only been a dereliction of Israel's duty to ensure public order and safety
but was undertaken in a conscious effort to ensure the deterioration of
these conditions. 178 The dire situation caused by the blockade in this re-
gard has been made worse by a "standstill in cooperation" between Ha-
mas and the Palestinian Authority, leaving the population of the Gaza
Strip to fend for itself.179
Israel, as the occupying power in Gaza, is also required by Article
59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to agree to relief schemes on behalf
of the population of the Strip, facilitate these relief schemes by "all
means at its disposal," permit the free passage of these consignments,
and guarantee their protection. 80 These relief schemes, according to the
Convention, "shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consign-
ments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing."' 8 An important
qualification to these duties is established by Article 59 in that
A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory
176. Amnesty International, for example, has reported: "Gaza's health sector has
been plagued by shortages in equipment and medical supplies during the blockade. Fol-
lowing the Israeli closure of crossings, people with medical conditions that cannot be
treated in Gaza have been required to apply for permits to leave the territory to receive
treatment in either foreign hospitals or Palestinian hospitals in the West Bank. The Israeli
authorities frequently delay or refuse these permits; some Gazans have died while waiting
to obtain permits to leave the territory for medical treatment elsewhere. World Health
Organization (WHO) trucks of medical equipment bound for Gazan hospitals have re-
peatedly been turned away, without explanation, by Israeli border officials." Suffocating
Gaza, supra note 136.
177. B'TSELEM, THE SIEGE ON THE GAZA STRIP: 1.5 MILLION PEOPLE IMPRISONED,
available at
HTrP://WWw.BTSELEM.ORG/ENGLIsH/GAZA STRIP/20100531 THESIEGEONGAZA.ASP.;
Gregg Carlstrom, Gaza's Real Humanitarian Crisis, AUAZEERA ENGLISH, June 3, 2010,
at http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/05/20105319333613851.html.
178. See Gisha, Gaza Closure Defined, supra note 144, detailing the history of Isra-
el's closure policy in response to political events and concluding that "Israel's restrictions
on movement in and out of Gaza constitute a closure undertaken for purposes of collec-
tive punishment."
179. ICRC News Release, supra note 153.
180. Geneva IV, supra note 172, art. 59.
18 1. Id.
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occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the
right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to
prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the
Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief of
the needy poulation and are not to be used for the benefit of the Occupy-
ing Power.' 8
As the Official ICRC Commentary to this article states, however,
these safeguards "must in no case be misused in order to make the rule
itself inoperative or unduly delay the forwarding of relief."' 8 3 Any reli-
ance by Israel on rights established by Article 59 as a justification for its
flotilla raid would appear to run afoul of this principle. Given the dire
situation in Gaza, 184 it would be difficult for Israel to claim that Israeli
actions are not causing "undue delay" in relief. Since the imposition of
Israel's closure police in 2007, Israel has imposed such severe re-
strictions, that the amount of supplies allowed to enter Gaza has been se-
verely reduced.' 85 The 1.5 million person population of Gaza has had to
do with a third of supplies they received in 2005.186 Certain basic goods
are not allowed in at all.187 While some goods are allowed through the
various land crossings, these are allowed solely at Israel's discretion and
are often closed or severely restricted, limiting the amount of goods al-
lowed to enter Gaza.' 88 Accordingly, we argue that Israel did not legiti-
mately invoke its privileges under Article 59 on May 31, but instead en-
gaged in the simple contravention of its legal duty to permit the free
passage of relief schemes, protect those consignments, and facilitate
them by all available means.
CONCLUSION
When Israel raided the flotilla, it violated international law in three
essential ways: (1) it intercepted on the high seas a series of ships flying
182. Id.
183. ICRC, Commentary to Article 59, supra note 117, para. 4.
184. See, e.g., U.N. Report, supra note 6, 37-44; Suffocating Gaza, AMNESTY
INT'L (June 1, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/suffocating-gaza-
israeli-blockades-effects-palestinians-2010-06-01.
185. Guide: Gaza Under Blockade, BBC NEWS (July 6, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7545636.stm.
186. Id.
187. Id.
18 8. Id.
109
110 BERKELEYJ OF MIDDLE EASTERN& ISLAMIC LAW Vol. 4:1
the flags of several sovereign nations; (2) the raid was conducted in a
manner that violated several provisions of the international humanitarian
law governing armed conflict; and (3) it was done to enforce a blockade
against the Gaza Strip which is wholly illegal.
Israel's arguments in its defense, that its interception of the flotilla
was necessary in order to enforce its blockade of the Gaza Strip, and that
it acted in self-defense fail as well. As the U.N. Human Rights Council
states unconditionally in its report, "Certain results flow from this con-
clusion [that the blockade is unlawful]. Principally, the action of the Isra-
el Defense Force in intercepting the Mavi Marmara on the high seas in
the circumstances and for the reasons given was clearly unlawful. Specif-
ically, the action cannot be justified in the circumstances even under Ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
